This paper integrates models of atemporal risk preference that relax the independence axiom, into a recursive intertemporal asset-pricing framework. The resulting models are amenable to empirical analysis using market data and standard Euler equation methods. We are thereby able to provide the rst nonlaboratory-based evidence regarding the usefulness of several new theories of risk preference for addressing standard problems in dynamic economics. Using both stock and bond returns data, we nd that a model incorporating risk preferences that exhibit rst-order risk aversion accounts for signi cantly more of the mean and autocorrelation properties of the data than models that exhibit only second-order risk aversion.
Introduction
The expected utility model of decision making under risk, and particularly its cornerstone the independence axiom, have come under attack recently. The empirical evidence upon which this criticism is based consists mostly of behavioral/experimental studies where subjects' choices amongst hypothetical and/or small scale gambles are observed (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , Chew and Waller (1986) , Camerer (1989a Camerer ( , 1989b and Conlisk (1989) ). Machina (1982) surveys much of the evidence and argues that violations of the independence axiom are both systematic and widespread. A number of new theories of choice under risk have been developed in an attempt to explain the evidence which contradicts expected utility theory. Those upon which we focus here are due to Chew (1983 Chew ( , 1989 , and Gul (1991) .
In this paper we use the general intertemporal asset-pricing model developed in Epstein and Zin (1989) and aggregate monthly U.S. time-series data for consumption and asset returns as the basis for an empirical examination of the generalized theories of Chew and Gul. In common with much of the empirical literature on aggregate consumption and asset returns, we assume the existence of a representative agent, the homotheticity of preferences and the rationality of expectations. We inquire whether, given these assumptions, relaxing the independence axiom in the directions de ned by Chew and Gul can help account for the time-series data. To our knowledge this is the rst evidence available regarding the usefulness of these newly developed theories of choice for explaining market data. Of course, tests of a theory based on behavior in the eld (as opposed to the laboratory) are prone to potentially serious problems such as errors in data measurement and unavoidable joint hypotheses. Laboratory-based methods, however, also have well-known drawbacks and the behavioral evidence is inconclusive. Some recent behavioral studies (e.g., Conlisk (1989) , Camerer (1989b) and Hey and Orme (1993) ) have cast doubt upon the extent and systematic nature of violations of expected utility theory. Thus we feel that an analysis based upon market data would provide an important complementary piece of evidence regarding the usefulness of the generalized theories of choice. Moreover, we suspect that many economists would attach greater importance to the question of whether these new theories do (or do not) help to resolve some of the standard problems in economics, than to their consistency with laboratory behavior. The explanation of asset returns clearly quali es as such a standard problem.
Representative agent models, with preferences represented by the expected value of the discounted sum of within-period utilities, have not performed well in explaining the behavior of consumption and asset returns over time (e.g., Hansen and Singleton (1982, 1983) and Mehra and Prescott (1985) ). This in part motivates the work in Epstein and Zin (1989) which formulates a class of intertemporal utility functions which are recursive but not necessarily additive or consistent with expected utility theory. Recursive utility permits some degree of separation in the modelling of risk aversion and intertemporal substitution. In Epstein and Zin (1991) , generalized method of moments estimation procedures are applied to the Euler equations implied by a particular parametric member of this class of utility functions. The results are mixed though some support is provided for the generalized speci cation. The functional form used in that study does not necessarily conform with intertemporal expected utility. However, it satis es the independence axiom for the set of so-called timeless wealth gambles{those for which all uncertainty is resolved before further consumption/savings decisions are made. Since these are precisely the sort of gambles that are considered in the experimental literature, the speci cation of intertemporal utility that is estimated in Epstein and Zin (1991) is inconsistent with the cited evidence against the independence axiom. This paper focuses on the empirical gains from further generalizations of intertemporal utility to speci cations in which orderings of timeless wealth gambles conform with the theories of Chew and Gul and not necessarily with the independence axiom.
The Euler equations implied by a representative agent's consumption{ portfolio selection problem form the basis for the empirical analysis. We rst make graphical comparisons of the mean{variance properties of the stochastic discount rates, i.e., the marginal rates of intertemporal substitution, that are implied by the Euler equations for each model. In addition, these mean/variance properties can be used as in Hansen and Jagannathan (1990) , to form a test of these asset pricing models. Second, we provide a more formal statistical analysis based on the generalized method of moments. Finally, we note the relationship between the general preference-based models and standard expected utility models in which consumption growth rates are subject to exogenous stochastic process switching.
The paper proceeds as follows: The next two sections lay the groundwork for the empirical analysis by summarizing and applying the most relevant material from the two literatures on decision theory and intertemporal asset pricing. In section 2, the Chew (1983 Chew ( , 1989 and Gul (1991) utility functions are described. Section 3 outlines their integration into a recursive model of intertemporal utility based on Epstein and Zin (1989) and presents the implied model of asset returns. Section 4 contains the empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes and summarizes the paper.
Certainty Equivalents for Timeless Wealth Gambles
In this section we summarize the relevant aspects of the utility functions proposed by Chew (1983 Chew ( , 1989 and Gul (1991) . These functions represent preferences over atemporal or one-shot gambles. Integration into a multiperiod setting is described in the next section.
Consider a utility function de ned on a subset of D(R 1 ++ ), the set of cumulative distribution functions (cdf's) F on the positive real line. If x > 0; then d x represents the gamble in which the outcome x is certain; d x (y) = 0 if y < x and d x (y) = 1 if y x. Similarly, F = P n i=1 p i d x i represents the gamble in which the outcome x i is realized with probability p i , i = 1; 2; : : :; n.
Only the ordinal properties of are relevant. Without essential loss of generality, therefore, we can assume that (d x ) = x ; for all x > 0 :
(1) As a result, assigns to any cdf F its certainty equivalent, i.e., that wealth level x such that receiving x with certainty is indi erent to the gamble represented by F.
Thus we refer to as a certainty equivalent function.
Consistent with the relevant empirical literature on intertemporal asset pricing and consumption, we assume that exhibits constant relative risk aversion. That is, for any random variablex with cdf Fx, (F x ) = (Fx) ; for all > 0 :
The functional forms for considered in this paper are all special cases of the following, which represents the constant-relative-risk-averse members of the family of semi-weighted utility functions studied by Chew (1989) : Though the general form of (3){(3) has an intuitive interpretation, (see below), we nd it instructive to restrict our attention initially to the parametric specializations we will use in our empirical investigation. Accordingly, restrict the valuation and weight functions to have the forms:
w L (x) = x and w U (x) = Ax
Consider the further parametric restrictions: 0 < A 1 and + 2 < 1:
In the Appendix it is shown that given (4){(6), we can nd an interval a; b], depending on and , 0 < a < 1 < b, such that equation (3) (i) = 0 and < 1 ; or (ii) < 0 and 0 < + < 1 ; or (7) (iii) 0 < < 1 and + < 0 :
Turn to some special cases. For greater ease of interpretation, we express the functional forms for cdf's having nite support.
Expected Utility ( = 0, A = 1) With these parameter restrictions we obtain the linearly homogeneous expected utility certainty equivalent:
The Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion equals 1 ? .
Weighted Utility (A = 1)
The constant-relative-risk-averse form of Chew's (1983) weighted utility theory is given by
Note that WU is a single-parameter extension of (8). The connection between expected and weighted utility is clari ed by reference to their implied indi erence curves in the probability simplex for the case of three-outcome gambles (n = 3). (See Figure 1 ). It is well-known that the indi erence curves of EU are parallel straight lines. For WU , indi erence curves remain linear but if 6 = 0 they emanate from a nite point, Q, in the plane; Q recedes to in nity as ! 0.
In the triangle shown, indi erence curves corresponding to higher levels of utility are steeper. Such indi erence curves are said to fan out. Machina (1982) , via his Hypothesis II, points out the close connection between fanning out and consistency with Allais-type behavior and the empirical patterns that have come to be known as the common consequence e ect and the common ratio e ect. But recent behavioral evidence regarding fanning out is inconclusive (see the papers by Camerer and Conlisk). Fortunately, if > 0, weighted utility also admits fanning in, where the the point Q lies to the north-east of the triangle and higher indi erence curves are atter.
The degree of risk aversion implicit in WU is of interest. It follows from Chew (1983 Chew ( , p.1083 ) that the risk premium for a random variable with mean x and a small variance 2 x 2 is approximately x 2 (1 ? ? 2 )=2. Thus (1 ? ? 2 ) is a measure of relative risk aversion for small gambles about certainty. Risk aversion increases as or falls.
Disappointment Aversion ( = 0)
If we set = 0 in (5) then (3) implies the following functional form, which is the constant-relative-risk-averse specialization of the utility functions axiomatized by Gul (1991) This functional form provides an alternative single parameter extension of expected utility for which A = 1. The generalization to A < 1 admits the following psychological interpretation. Refer to an outcome x i as disappointing if it is worse than expected in the sense of being smaller than the certainty equivalent of the gamble according to DA . In (11), disappointing outcomes generate negative values for the second summations on the right sides, if A ?1 ? 1 > 0. Thus the certainty equivalent is smaller than it would be if A = 1, re ecting an aversion to disappointment. 1 1 There is a similarity in spirit between the structure of DA and the hypothesis of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) that individuals evaluate risky prospects in terms of gains and losses relative to a reference position. Here the reference position is the certainty equivalent of the gamble and the gains and losses are treated di erently in computing the utility of the prospect. Since the reference point is endogenous and depends on the gamble in question, one obtains an ordering based on nal wealth positions. In the cited sources, an exogenously speci ed reference position is taken to apply to all gambles under consideration and the preference ordering is de ned on deviations from that position. Say that individual 1 is more risk averse than individual 2 if any gamble that is rejected by 2 in favor of a certain prize is also rejected by individual 1. With greater risk aversion de ned accordingly, Gul shows that risk aversion increases as or A falls.
An important feature of the risk aversion embedded in DA is portrayed in Figure 2 , which shows the indi erence curves in outcome space for binary gambles with xed probabilities p 1 and p 2 . For the expected utility functions EU , the corresponding indi erence curves are tangent at the certainty line to the actuarially fair market line of slope ?p 1 =p 2 . Thus EU is risk neutral to the rst order (Arrow (1965) ) and the risk premium for a small gamble is proportional to its variance. In contrast, the tangency fails for DA if A < 1, in which case the risk premium for a small binary gamble is proportional to the standard deviation and we say that DA exhibits rst-order risk aversion. (See Segal and Spivak (1990) for a general treatment of rst-order risk aversion and Epstein and Zin (1990) for an application to asset pricing.)
The most general speci cation is (3){(6). These functional forms represent a two-parameter, 6 = 0 and A 6 = 1, extension of expected utility which contains both weighted utility and disappointment-averse utility. The semi-weighted certainty equivalent, SW ( 
for 6 = 0, and similarly for = 0.
It is straightforward to provide a disappointment-aversion interpretation for A < 1 and also to show that the latter implies rst-order risk aversion. Risk aversion increases as , or A falls. Finally, a probability simplex indi erence map for SW is shown in Figure 1 . (Other con gurations for Q and Q 0 are possible, though in all cases they are collinear with the vertex p 2 = 1). All of the above certainty equivalents share the property that indi erence curves in the three-outcome probability simplex are straight lines and more generally are hyperplanes in higher dimensional simplices. Thus they satisfy the axiom of betweenness, which is a weakening of the independence axiom proposed and studied by Fishburn (1983) , Dekel (1986) and Chew (1983 Chew ( , 1989 ).
There exist in the literature alternative generalizations of expected utility which can explain some of the accumulated behavioral evidence. Two such alternatives are prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979) ), and rank-dependent or anticipated utility theory (Quiggin (1982) , Yaari (1987) and Segal (1989) , for example). But in each case, there are serious di culties associated with adopting the corresponding functional forms in the analysis to follow. For example, prospect theory violates rstdegree stochastic dominance unless potential violations are eliminated in a preliminary editing phase, but a satisfactory speci cation of the latter is not apparent to us. On the other hand, the central role played by the rank ordering of outcomes in the structure of rank-dependent theory makes it computationally intractable in our multiple asset portfolio choice context. 2 In contrast, there are no such di culties associated with the betweenness-conforming utility functions adopted here. Whether alternative generalizations of the independence axiom and expected utility can help to explain the data we study, must remain a subject for future research.
Intertemporal Asset Pricing With Recursive Utility
The certainty equivalent functions of the last section are now integrated into an in nite-horizon, intertemporal setting. Then we describe the restrictions implied for consumption and asset returns by the optimizing behavior of a representative agent. The reader is referred to Epstein and Zin (1989) for the details which support the discussion in this section.
There is a single consumption good in each period. In period t, current consumption, c t , is known with certainty, but future consumption levels are generally risky.
Thus intertemporal utility is de ned over random consumption sequences. It is assumed that the intertemporal utility function is recursive in the sense that the utility U t , derived from consumption in period t and beyond, satis es the recursive relation U t = W(c t ; t ) ; t 0 ; (12) where t = (Ũ t+1 ) is the certainty equivalent of random future utility,Ũ t+1 , conditional upon period t information. 3 The function W is called an aggregator since it aggregates current consumption, c t , with a certainty-equivalent index of the future in order to determine current utility. For the certainty equivalent function we take the semi-weighted form SW . In our earlier work we show that represents the implied preference ordering over timeless wealth gambles, i.e., gambles in which all uncertainty is resolved before further consumption takes place. Moreover, we have already noted that all of the behavioral evidence referred to above regarding individual choice under uncertainty is based on choices amongst timeless gambles. Thus the preceding discussion of SW is pertinent. In particular, risk aversion with respect to timeless wealth gambles is inversely related to each of the parameters , A and .
The specializations of SW discussed above imply corresponding subclasses of recursive intertemporal utility functions. Note that the expected utility certainty equivalent speci cation EU (see (8) 
Rather, EU leads to the in nite-horizon generalization of the intertemporal utility function of Kreps and Porteus (1978) , explored empirically in Epstein and Zin (1991) . The speci cation (14) corresponds to the added restriction that = 1 1? , leaving only a single parameter to model both intertemporal substitution and risk aversion. Our earlier work examined the empirical gains from relaxing this constraint. This paper is concerned with the further gains from relaxing the parameter restrictions = 0 and A = 1.
From the perspective of the latter objective, it is interesting to note the following result due to Du e and Epstein (1992, section 4). When recursive utility is suitably formulated in a continuous-time setting with a Brownian information environment, weighted utility and expected utility certainty equivalents are observationally equivalent to one another, whereas (and this is strongly suggested, though not proven by their analysis) they are distinguishable from DA . Moreover, the essential reason for this di erence between DA and WU seems to be that the former alone satis es rst-order risk aversion. Since in the present paper we are not assuming a Brownianinformation, continuous-time setting, we cannot rule out the potential empirical importance of the generalization from EU ( = 0, A = 1) to WU (A = 1). On the other hand, this result suggests that an empirical analysis such as ours should include consideration of certainty equivalents like DA that exhibit rst-order risk aversion.
We now describe the implications for asset returns and consumption of a representative agent having recursive intertemporal utility. The agent is assumed to operate in a standard competitive environment. There are N assets and the i th asset has positive gross real return r i;t when held over the interval t ? 1; t]. Denote by M t the return to wealth over the same interval.
In the Appendix we derive the following Euler equations which represent rstorder conditions for the representative agent's consumption/portfolio choice problem: E t?1 h(z t )I A (z t ) r i;t ? r j;t M t = 0 ; (15) i 6 = j = 1; : : :; N, and E t?1 (z t )] = 0 ; (16) where is de ned by (4) (17) h(x) = For these Euler equations to be valid in the general case where A 6 = 1 we must restrict the probability distribution of consumption growth and asset returns as described in the Appendix. Su cient conditions are that for each information set at the return to the market. Of course, if A = 1 and = 0 then one obtains the model of asset returns studied in Epstein and Zin (1991) which has as special cases both the static CAPM when = 0, and the consumption CAPM when = 1 1? . This latter restriction corresponds to the standard expected utility model studied by Hansen and Singleton (1982, 1983) .
To obtain a set of restrictions that apply directly to the levels of individual asset returns, multiply (15) (20) which is an equation restricting the level of each return, i = 1; : : :; N.
Empirical Analysis
We employ two related methods for evaluating the empirical implications of the models developed above. We evaluate the mean{variance properties of the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution implied by our models using the methods developed in Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) . Other moment properties implied by our models are evaluated using the generalized method of moments (GMM) (Hansen (1982) ). The data we use are relatively standard. Consumption is measured as U.S. monthly per capita expenditures on nondurables and services. The monthly nominal NYSE valueweighted return de ated with the implicit consumption defator, serves as our measure of the real return on the aggregate wealth portfolio{the variable M t in the notation of section 3. We do not assume that consumption is equivalent to the dividend on this portfolio. However, this measure of the market return is open to Roll's (1977) critique. In particular, we are assuming that assets such as government bonds do not contribute to aggregate wealth. In addition to this equity return, we investigate the properties of an additional return. The nominal return on one-month U.S. treasury bills de ated by the consumption de ator, serves as the real return to a riskless, pure-discount bond. 4 The data span the period 1959:4{1986:12. 5 4 Luttmer (1992) discusses the problems associated with this particular security return. The large bid-ask spread in this market is likely to be symptomatic of signi cant transactions costs which, in turn, can signi cantly change the implications of the model. We adopt this measure primarily to facilitate comparisons with past empirical work.
5 Consumption data are from Citibase, the value-weighted return is from CRSP and the t-bill return is from the Fama-Bliss le from CRSP. Data construction is detailed in Epstein and Zin (1991) .
The asset pricing models derived in the previous sections has the geometric structure studied by Hansen and Richard (1987) . That is, the model predicts that equilibrium asset prices are determined by the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution (MRS) which discounts future asset payo s before they are averaged across states. For example, we can rewrite our models' asset-pricing equations for excess returns given in (15) as E t?1 MRS t;t?1 (r i;t ? r j;t )] = 0 ; (21) where the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution of c t for c t?1 is MRS t;t?1 = M ?1 t h(z t )I A (z t ) ;
for z t de ned in (17). The marginal rate of intertemporal substitution for an individual asset return, rather than an excess return, is de ned in (20) as
We focus on the properties of MRS rather than on MRS since the latter involves a conditional expectation which is di cult to compute. 6 Hansen and Jaganathan (1991) show that the restrictions on the covariances between MRS and asset returns implied by equations such as (21) generate an inequality restriction for the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of MRS. They estimate this bound using various stock and bond return data. Using the value-weighted return on the NYSE and the return on one-month t-bills, they estimate a bound of 0:14. Using one-month holding period returns for t-bills with one to six month maturities they obtain a substantially larger lower bound for the standard deviation{mean ratio of 0:79. It is clear from the sizable di erence in these numbers that term-structure evidence typically provides more of a challenge for asset-pricing models, e.g. Backus, Gregory and Zin (1989) .
Equations (16) and (20) form the basis of our GMM analysis of the models discussed above. We concentrate on two assets, the value-weighted return and the onemonth t-bill return. Since we are treating the value-weighted return as a measure of the return on the aggregate wealth portfolio we use equation (16) (24) where z t is de ned in equation (17) and r B t is the t-bill return. These equations de ne the vector of forecast errors, " t = " M t " B t ] > , which has the property E t?1 " t ] = 0 : (25) Therefore, any variable that is in the period-(t ? 1) information set is orthogonal to the period-t forecast error and can be used to construct an unconditional moment restriction. The additive forecast errors in the Euler equations of this model make the empirical analysis much more amenable to standard econometric methods than other models with rst-order risk aversion (e.g. Epstein and Zin (1990) 
The linear restrictions implied by (26) . It is clear from these gures that the data do not allow much discrimination between the e ects of and . Neither the standard deviation{mean ratios nor the GMM objective functions exhibit much variation in the dimensions in which (1 ? ? 2 ) is constant. Recall that this measures relative risk aversion for small gambles. In other words, the Weighted Utility model has basically the same implications in this sample as the Expected Utility model (i.e., the KrepsPorteus intertemporal utility function). This con rms the theoretical conclusion for this model in Du e and . Note, however, that this model can generate a substantial amount of variation in MRS (relative to its mean) provided relative risk aversion is su ciently high. The = 0:01 case requires much larger risk aversion to achieve this than the = 5 case. 7 like a stochastic switching process. That is, it appears to switch in a negatively autocorrelated fashion from a distribution with a relatively high mean to one with a relatively low mean. 9
Conclusions
We have shown that some recent developments in the theory of choice under uncertainty due to Chew (1983 ), and Gul (1991 , that relax the independence axiom of expected utility, can be incorporated into a recursive asset-pricing model without sacri cing either theoretical or empirical tractability. We are able to provide the rst tests of these new theories using actual market data rather than laboratory experiments. Our evidence indicates that the generalization to Weighted Utility does not enhance the explanatory power of our asset-pricing model for the data we consider. On the other hand, we nd that using preferences that exhibit rst-order risk aversion can lead to a representative agent model that appears to be consistent with the data. A model with a moderate rate of time preference, a very small elasticity of intertemporal substitution, a moderate amount of second-order risk aversion, and a substantial amount of rst-order risk aversion is not rejected by the data. Thus there exists a (unique) such that R (x= )dF(x) = 0: We de ne SW (F) = .
Properties (1) and (2) where r t is the vector of gross real returns, M t = ! > t?1 r t , the return to the market portfolio, z t is de ned in equation (17) and where ! = (! 1 ; : : :; ! N ) varies over the simplex f! : ! i 0 for all i and P ! i = 1g. We will show that, under additional assumptions, the objective function in (A.1) is di erentiable at ! t?1 and the associated rst-order conditions are given by (15). The existence of an interior optimum is assumed.
De ne g(x) = It then follows that (15) represents the rst-order conditions for (A.1).
Assumption 1: For each information set at time t ? 1, the conditional distribution of r t has compact support in the positive orthant.
Assumption 2: For each information set at t ? 1, there exists an > 0 such that sup 0< < ?1 Prob t?1 (fz t : 1 ? < z t < 1 + g) < 1:
A necessary condition for Assumption 2 is that the conditional probability that z t = 1 be zero. A su cient condition is that z t have bounded conditional density function. One can apply elementary arguments and the fact that g(1) = 0 to the di erence quotient corresponding to (A.3) to prove the latter. Details are omitted.
